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ABSTRACT
We explore the striking mathematical connections that ex-
ist between market scoring rules, cost function based pre-
diction markets, and no-regret learning. We show that any
cost function based prediction market can be interpreted as
an algorithm for the commonly studied problem of learning
from expert advice by equating trades made in the mar-
ket with losses observed by the learning algorithm. If the
loss of the market organizer is bounded, this bound can be
used to derive an O(
√
T ) regret bound for the corresponding
learning algorithm. We then show that the class of markets
with convex cost functions exactly corresponds to the class
of Follow the Regularized Leader learning algorithms, with
the choice of a cost function in the market corresponding to
the choice of a regularizer in the learning problem. Finally,
we show an equivalence between market scoring rules and
prediction markets with convex cost functions. This implies
that market scoring rules can also be interpreted naturally
as Follow the Regularized Leader algorithms, and may be of
independent interest. These connections provide new insight
into how it is that commonly studied markets, such as the
Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule, can aggregate opinions
into accurate estimates of the likelihood of future events.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are interested in learning an accurate esti-
mate of the probability that the United States unemploy-
ment rate for a particular month will fall below 10%. You
could choose to spend hours digging through news arti-
cles, reading financial reports, and weighing various opin-
ions against each other, eventually coming up with a rea-
sonably informed estimate. However, you could potentially
save yourself a lot of hassle (and obtain a better estimate!)
by appealing to the wisdom of crowds.
A prediction market is a financial market designed for
information aggregation. For example, in a cost function
based prediction market [5], the organizer (ormarket maker)
trades a set of securities corresponding to each potential out-
come of an event. The market maker might offer a security
that pays $1 if and only if the United States unemployment
rate for January 2010 is above 10%. A risk neutral trader
who believes that the true probability that the unemploy-
ment rate will be above 10% is p should be willing to buy
a share of this security at any price below $p. Similarly,
he should be willing to sell a share of this security at any
price above $p. For this reason, the current market price
of this security can be viewed as the population’s collective
estimate of how likely it is that the unemployment rate will
be above 10%.
These estimates have proved quite accurate in practice
in a wide variety of domains. (See Ledyard et al. [27] for
an impressive assortment of examples.) The theory of ra-
tional expectations equilibria offers some insight into why
prediction markets in general should converge to accurate
prices, but is plagued by strong assumptions and no-trade
theorems [31]. Furthermore, this theory says nothing of
why particular prediction market mechanisms, such as Han-
son’s increasingly popular Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule
(LMSR) [15, 16], might produce more accurate estimates
than others in practice. In this work, we aim to provide ad-
ditional insight into the learning power of particular market
mechanisms by highlighting the deep mathematical connec-
tions between prediction markets and no-regret learning.
It should come as no surprise that there is a connection
between prediction markets and learning. The theories of
markets and learning are built upon many of the same funda-
mental concepts, such as proper scoring rules (called proper
losses in the learning community) and Bregman divergences.
To our knowledge, Chen et al. [6] were the first to formally
demonstrate a connection, showing that the standard Ran-
domized Weighted Majority regret bound [9] can be used as
a starting point to rederive the well-known bound on the
worst-case loss of a LMSR marker maker. (They went on
to show that PermELearn, an extension of Weighted Major-
ity to permutation learning [20], can be used to efficiently
run LMSR over combinatorial outcome spaces for betting on
rankings.) As we show in Section 4, the converse is also true;
the Weighted Majority regret bound can be derived directly
from the bound on the worst-case loss of a market maker
using LMSR. However, the connection goes much deeper.
In Section 4, we show how any cost function based pre-
diction market with bounded loss can be interpreted as a
no-regret learning algorithm. Furthermore, if the loss of the
market maker is bounded, this bound can be used to derive
an O(
√
T ) regret bound for the corresponding learning algo-
rithm. The key ides is to view the trades made in the market
as losses observed by the learning algorithm. We can then
think of the market maker as learning a probability distri-
bution over outcomes by treating each observed trade as a
training instance.
In Section 5, we go on to show that the class of con-
vex cost function based markets exactly corresponds to
the class of Follow the Regularized Leader learning algo-
rithms [34, 18, 17] in which weights are chosen at each time
step to minimize a combination of empirical loss and a con-
vex regularization term. This allows us to interpret the se-
lection of a cost function for the market as the selection
of a regularizer for the learning problem. Furthermore, we
prove an equivalence between another common class of pre-
diction markets, market scoring rules, and convex cost func-
tion based markets,1 which immediately implies that market
scoring rules can be interpreted as Follow the Regularized
Leader algorithms too. These connections provide insight
into why it is that prediction markets tend to yield such
accurate estimates in practice.
Before describing our results in more detail, we review the
relevant concepts and results from the literature on predic-
tion markets and no-regret learning in Sections 2 and 3.
2. PREDICTION MARKETS
In recent years, a variety of compelling prediction mar-
ket mechanisms have been proposed and studied, includ-
ing standard call market mechanisms and Pennock’s dy-
namic parimutuel markets [30]. In this work we focus on
two broad classes of mechanisms: Hanson’s market scoring
rules [15, 16] and cost function based prediction markets as
described in Chen and Pennock [5]. We also briefly discuss
the related class of Sequential Convex Parimutuel Mecha-
nisms [1] in Section 5.4.
2.1 Market Scoring Rules
Scoring rules have long been used in the evaluation of
probabilistic forecasts. In the context of prediction markets
and elicitation, scoring rules are used to encourage individ-
uals to make careful assessments and truthfully report their
beliefs [33, 11, 26]. In the context of machine learning, scor-
ing rules are used as loss functions to evaluate and compare
the performance of different algorithms [3, 32].
Formally, let {1, · · · , N} be a set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive outcomes of a future event. A scoring rule ~smaps
a probability distribution ~p to a score si(~p) for each outcome
i, with si(~p) taking values in the extended real line [−∞,∞].
Intuitively, this score represents the reward of a forecaster
might receive for predicting the distribution ~p if the outcome
turns out to be i. A scoring rule is said to be regular relative
to the probability simplex ∆N if
∑N
i=1 pisi(~p
′) ∈ [−∞,∞)
for all ~p, ~p ′ ∈ ∆N , with ∑Ni=1 pisi(~p) ∈ (−∞,∞). This
implies that si(~p) is finite whenever pi > 0. A scoring
rule is said to be proper if a risk-neutral forecaster who be-
lieves the true distribution over outcomes to be ~p has no
incentive to report any alternate distribution ~p ′, that is, if∑N
i=1 pisi(~p) ≥
∑N
i=1 pisi(~p
′) for all distributions ~p ′. The
rule is strictly proper if this inequality holds with equality
only when ~p = ~p ′.
Two examples of regular, strictly proper scoring rules
commonly used in both elicitation and in machine learning
are the the quadratic scoring rule [2]:
si(~p) = ai + b
(
2pi −
N∑
i=1
p2i
)
(1)
and the logarithmic scoring rule [13]:
si(~p) = ai + b log(pi) (2)
with arbitrary parameters a1, · · · , aN and parameter b > 0.
The uses and properties of scoring rules are too extensive
1A similar but weaker correspondence between market scor-
ing rules and cost function based markets was discussed in
Chen and Pennock [5] and Agrawal et al. [1].
to cover in detail here. For a nice survey, see Gneiting and
Raftery [12].
Market scoring rules were developed by Hanson [15, 16] as
a method of using scoring rules to pool opinions from many
different forecasters. Market scoring rules are sequentially
shared scoring rules. Formally, the market maintains a cur-
rent probability distribution ~p. At any time, a trader can
enter the market and change this distribution to an arbitrary
distribution ~p ′ of her choice.2 If the outcome turns out to be
i, she receives a (possibly negative) payoff of si(~p
′)− si(~p).
For example, in the popular Logarithmic Market Scoring
Rule (LMSR), which is based on the logarithmic scoring
rule in Equation 2, a trader who changes the distribution
from ~p to ~p ′ receives a payoff of b log(p′i/pi).
Since the trader has no control over ~p, a myopic trader who
believes the true distribution to be ~r maximizes her expected
payoff by maximizing
∑
i risi(~p
′). Thus if ~s is a strictly
proper scoring rule, traders have an incentive to change the
market’s distribution to match their true beliefs. The idea
is that if traders update their own beliefs over time based on
market activity, the market’s distribution should eventually
converge to the collective beliefs of the population.
Each trader in a market scoring rule is essentially responsi-
ble for paying the previous trader’s score. Thus the market
maker is responsible only for paying the score of the final
trader. Let ~p0 be the initial probability distribution of the
market. The worst case loss of the market maker is then
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
max
~p∈∆N
(si(~p)− si(~p0)) .
The worst case loss of the market maker running an LMSR
initialized to the uniform distribution is b logN .
Note that the parameters a1, · · · , aN of the logarithmic
scoring rule do not affect either the payoff of traders or the
loss of the market maker in the LMSR. For simplicity, in
the remainder of this paper when discussing the LMSR we
assume that ai = 0 for all i.
2.2 Cost Function Based Markets
As before, let {1, · · · , N} be a set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive outcomes of an event. In a cost function
based market, a market maker offers a security correspond-
ing to each outcome i. The security associated with outcome
i pays off $1 if i happens, and $0 otherwise.3
Different mechanisms can be used to determine how these
securities are priced. Each mechanism is specified using a
differentiable cost function C : RN → R. This cost func-
tion is simply a potential function describing the amount of
money currently wagered in the market as a function of the
quantity of shares purchased. If qi is the number of shares of
security i currently held by traders, and a trader would like
to purchase ri shares of each security (where ri could be zero
or even negative, representing the sale of shares), the trader
must pay C(~q+~r)−C(~q) to the market maker. The instan-
taneous price of security i (that is, the price per share of an
infinitely small number of shares) is then pi = ∂C(~q)/∂qi.
2While ~p ′ may be arbitrary, in some market scoring rules,
such as the LMSR, distributions that place a weight of 0 on
any outcome are not allowed because it requires the trader to
pay infinite amount of money if the outcome with reported
probability 0 actually happens.
3The dynamic parimutuel market falls outside this frame-
work since the winning payoff depends on future trades.
We say that a cost function is valid if the associated prices
satisfy two simple conditions:
1. For every i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and every ~q ∈ RN , pi(~q) ≥ 0.
2. For every ~q ∈ RN , ∑Ni=1 pi(~q) = 1 .
The first condition ensures that the price of a security is
never negative. If the current price of the security associated
with an outcome i were negative, a trader could purchase
shares of this security at a guaranteed profit. The second
condition ensures that the prices of all securities sum to 1.
If the prices summed to something less than (respectively,
greater than) 1, then a trader could purchase (respectively,
sell) small equal quantities of each security for a guaranteed
profit. Together, these conditions ensure that there are no
arbitrage opportunities in the market.
These conditions also ensure that the current prices can
always be viewed as a valid probability distribution over the
outcome space. In fact, these prices represent the market’s
current estimate of the probability that outcome i will occur.
The following theorem gives sufficient and necessary con-
ditions for the cost function C to be valid. While these prop-
erties of cost functions have been discussed elsewhere [5, 1],
the fact that they are both sufficient and necessary for any
valid cost function C is important for our later analysis. As
such, we state the full proof here for completeness.
Theorem 1. A cost function C is valid if and only if it
satisfies the following three properties:
1. Differentiability: The partial derivatives
∂C(~q)/∂qi exist for all ~q ∈ RN and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. Increasing Monotonicity: For any ~q and ~q ′, if ~q ≥
~q ′, then C(~q) ≥ C(~q ′).
3. Positive Translation Invariance: For any ~q and
any constant k, C(~q + k~1) = C(~q) + k.
Proof. Differentiability is necessary and sufficient for the
price functions to be well-defined at all points. It is easy
to see that requiring the cost function to be monotonic is
equivalent to requiring that pi(~q) ≥ 0 for all i and ~q. We
will show that requiring positive translation invariance is
equivalent to requiring that the prices always sum to one.
First, assume that
∑N
i=1 pi(~q) = 1 for all ~q. For any fixed
value of ~q, define ~u = ~u(a) = ~q + a~1 and let ui be the ith
component of ~u. Then for any k,
C(~q + k~1)− C(~q) =
∫ k
0
dC(~q + a~1)
da
da
=
∫ k
0
N∑
i=1
∂C(~u)
∂ui
∂ui
∂a
da
=
∫ k
0
N∑
i=1
pi(~u)da = k .
This is precisely translation invariance.
Now assume instead that positive translation invariance
holds. Fix any arbitrary ~q ′ and k and define ~q = ~q ′ + k~1.
Notice that by setting ~q ′ and k appropriately, we can make
~q take on any arbitrary values. We have,
∂C(~q)
∂k
=
N∑
i=1
∂C(~q)
∂qi
∂qi
∂k
=
N∑
i=1
pi(~q).
By translation invariance, C(~q ′ + k~1) = C(~q ′) + k. Thus,
∂C(~q)
∂k
=
∂(C(~q ′) + k)
∂k
= 1.
Combining the two equations, we have
∑N
i=1 pi(~q) = 1.
One quantity that is useful for comparing different market
mechanisms is the worst-case loss of the market maker,
max
~q∈RN
(
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi − (C(~q)− C(~0))
)
.
This is simply the difference between the maximum amount
that the market maker might have to pay the winners and
the amount of money collected by the market maker.
The Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule described above
can be specified as a cost function based prediction mar-
ket [15, 5]. Then cost function of the LMSR is
C(~q) = b log
N∑
i=1
eqi/b ,
and the corresponding prices are
pi(~q) =
∂C(~q)
∂qi
=
eqi/b∑N
j=1 e
qj/b
.
This formulation is equivalent to the market scoring rule for-
mulation in the sense that a trader who changes the market
probabilities from ~r to ~r ′ in the MSR formulation receives
the same payoff for every outcome i as a trader who changes
the quantity vectors from any ~q to ~q ′ such that p(~q) = ~r and
p(~q ′) = ~r ′ in the cost function formulation.
3. LEARNING FROM EXPERT ADVICE
We now briefly review the problem of learning from expert
advice. In this framework, an algorithm makes a sequence
of predictions based on the advice of a set of N experts and
receives a corresponding sequence of losses.4 The goal of the
algorithm is to achieve a cumulative loss that is “almost as
low” as the cumulative loss of the best performing expert in
hindsight. No statistical assumptions are made about these
losses. Indeed, algorithms are expected to perform well even
if the sequence of losses is chosen by an adversary.
Formally, at every time step t ∈ {1, · · · , T}, every expert
i ∈ {1, · · · , N} receives a loss ℓi,t ∈ [0, 1]. The cumulative
loss of expert i at time T is then defined as Li,T =
∑T
t=1 ℓi,t.
An algorithm A maintains a weight wi,t for each expert
i at time t, where
∑n
i=1 wi,t = 1. These weights can be
viewed as a distribution over the experts. The algorithm
then receives its own instantaneous loss ℓA,t =
∑n
i=1 wi,tℓi,t,
which can be interpreted as the expected loss the algo-
rithm would receive if it always chose an expert to fol-
low according to the current distribution. The cumulative
loss of A up to time T is defined in the natural way as
LA,T =
∑T
t=1 ℓA,t =
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 wi,tℓi,t.
It is unreasonable to expect the algorithm to achieve a
small cumulative loss if none of the experts perform well.
As such, it is typical to measure the performance of an al-
gorithm in terms of its regret, defined to be the difference
4This framework could be formalized equally well in terms
of gains, but losses are more common in the literature.
between the cumulative loss of the algorithm and the loss of
the best performing expert, that is,
LA,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T .
An algorithm is said to have no regret if the average per
time step regret approaches 0 as T approaches infinity.
The popular Randomized Weighted Majority (WM) al-
gorithm [28, 9] is an example of a no-regret algorithm.
Weighted Majority uses weights
wi,t =
e−ηLi,t∑n
j=1 e
−ηLj,t
,
where η > 0 is a tunable parameter known as the learning
rate. It is well known that the regret of WM after T trials
can be bounded as
LWM(η),T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T ≤ ηT + logN
η
.
When T is known in advance, setting η =
√
logN/T yields
the standard O(
√
T logN) regret bound.
It has been shown that the weights chosen by Weighted
Majority are precisely those that minimize a combination of
empirical loss and an entropic regularization term [24, 25,
20]. More specifically, the weights at time t are precisely
those that minimize
N∑
i=1
wiLi,t−1 − 1
η
H(~w)
among all ~w ∈ ∆N , where H is the entropy. This makes
Weighted Majority an example of broader class of algorithms
collectively known as Follow the Regularized Leader algo-
rithms [34, 18, 17]. This class of algorithms grew out of the
following fundamental insight of Kalai and Vempala [22].
Consider first the aptly named Follow the Leader al-
gorithm, which chooses weights at time t to minimize∑N
i=1 wi,tLi,t−1. This algorithm simply places all of its
weight on the single expert (or set of experts) with the best
performance on previous examples. As such, this algorithm
can be highly unstable, dramatically changing its weights
from one time step to the next. It is easy to see that Follow
the Leader suffers Ω(T ) regret in the worst case when the
best expert changes frequently. For example, if there are
only two experts with losses starting at 〈1/2, 0〉 and then
alternating 〈0, 1〉 , 〈1, 0〉 , 〈0, 1〉 , 〈1, 0〉 , · · · , then FTL places
a weight of 1 on the losing expert at every point in time.
To overcome this instability, Kalai and Vempala [22] sug-
gested adding a random perturbation to the empirical loss
of each expert, and choosing the expert that minimizes this
perturbed loss.5 However, in general this perturbation need
not be random. Instead of adding a random perturbation,
it is possible to gain the necessary stability by adding a reg-
ularizer R and choosing weights to minimize
N∑
i=1
wi,tLi,t−1 +
1
η
R(~wt) . (3)
This Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) approach gets
around the instability of FTL and guarantees low regret for
a wide variety of regularizers, as evidenced by the following
bound of Hazan and Kale [18].
5A very similar algorithm was originally developed and an-
alyzed by Hannan in the 1950s [14].
Lemma 1 (Hazan and Kale [18]). For any regular-
izer R, the regret of FTRL can be bounded as
LFTRL(R,η),T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T
≤
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ℓi,t(wi,t −wi,t+1) + 1
η
(R(~wT )−R(~w0)) .
This lemma quantifies the trade-off that must be consid-
ered when choosing a regularizer. If the range of the regular-
izer is too small, the weights will change dramatically from
one round to the next, and the first term in the bound will
be large. On the other hand, if the range of the regularizer
is too big, the weights that are chosen will be too far from
the true loss minimizers and the second term will blow up.
It is generally assumed that the regularizer R is strictly
convex. This assumption ensures that Equation 3 has a
unique minimizer and that this minimizer can be computed
efficiently. Hazan [17] shows that if R is strictly convex then
it is possible to achieve a regret of O(
√
T ). In particular,
by optimizing η appropriately the regret bound in Lemma 1
can be upper bounded by
2
√
2λ max
~w,~w ′∈∆N
(R(~w)−R(~w ′))T (4)
where λ = maxℓ∈[0,1]N , ~w∈∆N ℓ
T [∇2R(~w)]−1ℓ.
4. INTERPRETING PREDICTION MAR-
KETS AS NO-REGRET LEARNERS
With this foundation in place, we are ready to describe
how any bounded loss market maker can be interpreted as
an algorithm for learning from expert advice. The key idea
is to equate the trades made in the market with the losses
observed by the learning algorithm. We can then view the
market maker as essentially learning a probability distri-
bution over outcomes by treating each observed trade as a
training instance.
More formally, consider any cost function based market
maker with instantaneous price functions pi for each out-
come i. We convert such a market maker to an algorithm
for learning from expert advice by setting the weight of ex-
pert i at time t using
wi,t = pi(−ǫ~Lt−1), (5)
where ǫ > 0 is a tunable parameter and ~Lt−1 =
〈L1,t−1, · · · , LN,t−1〉 is the vector of cumulative losses at
time t−1. In other words, the weight on expert i at time t in
the learning algorithm is the instantaneous price of security
i in the market when −ǫLj,t−1 shares have been purchased
(or ǫLj,t−1 shares have been sold) of each security j. We
discuss the role of the parameter ǫ in more detail below.
First note that for any valid cost function based predic-
tion market, setting the weights as in Equation 5 entails
valid expert learning algorithm. Since the prices of any
valid prediction market must be non-negative and sum to
one, the weights of the resulting algorithm are guaranteed
to satisfy these properties too. Furthermore, the weights are
a function of only the past losses of each expert, which the
algorithm is permitted to observe.
Below we show that applying this conversion to any
bounded-loss market maker with slowly changing prices
yields a learning algorithm with O(
√
T ) regret. The quality
of the regret bound obtained depends on the trade-off be-
tween market maker loss and how quickly the prices change.
We then show how this bound can be used to rederive the
standard regret bound of Weighted Majority, the converse
of the result of Chen et al. [6].
4.1 A Bound on Regret
In order to derive a regret bound for the learning algo-
rithm defined in Equation 5, it is necessary to make some
restrictions on how quickly the prices in the market change.
If market prices change too quickly, the resulting learning
algorithm will be unstable and will suffer high worst-case
regret, as was the case with the naive Follow The Leader
algorithm described in Section 3. To capture this idea, we
introduce the notion of φ-stability, defined as follows.
Definition 1. We say that a set of price functions
~p is φ-stable for a constant φ if pi is continuous
and piecewise differentiable for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1
∣∣Di,j(~t)∣∣ ≤ φ for all ~t, where
Di,j(~t) =


∂pi(~q)
∂qj
∣∣∣
~q=~t
if
∂pi(~q)
∂qj
is defined at ~t,
0 otherwise.
Defining φ-stability in terms of theDi,j allows us to quan-
tify how slowly the prices change even when the price func-
tions are not differentiable at all points. We can then derive
a regret bound for the resulting learning algorithm using the
following simple lemma. This lemma states that when the
quantity vector in the market is ~q, if the price functions are
φ-stable, then the amount of money that the market maker
would collect for the purchase of a small quantity ri of each
security i is not too far from the amount that the market
maker would have collected had he instead priced the shares
according to the fixed price ~p(~q).
Lemma 2. Let C be any valid cost function yielding φ-
stable prices. For any ǫ > 0, any ~q ∈ RN , and any ~r ∈ RN
such that |ri| ≤ ǫ for i ∈ {1, · · · , N},∣∣∣∣∣(C(~q + ~r)−C(~q))−
N∑
i=1
pi(~q)ri
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
2φ
2
.
The proof is in Appendix A.
With this lemma in place, we are ready to derive the re-
gret bound. In the following theorem, it is assumed that T
is known a priori and therefore can be used to set ǫ. If T
is not known in advance, a standard “doubling trick” can be
applied [4]. The idea behind the doubling trick is to par-
tition time into periods of exponentially increasing length,
restarting the algorithm each period. This leads to similar
bounds with only an extra factor of log(T ).
Theorem 2. Let C be any valid cost function yielding φ-
stable prices. Let B be a bound on the worst-case loss of
the market maker mechanism associated with C. Let A be
the expert learning algorithm with weights as in Equation 5
with ǫ =
√
2B/(φT ). Then for any sequence of expert losses
ℓi,t ∈ [0, 1] over T time steps,
LA,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T ≤
√
2BφT .
Proof. By setting the weights as in Equation 5, we are
essentially simulating a market over N outcomes. Let ri,t
denote the number of shares of outcome i purchased at time
step t in this simulated market, and denote by ~rt the vector
of these quantities for all i. Note that ri,t is completely in
our control since we are simply simulating a market, thus
we can choose to set ri,t = −ǫℓi,t for all i and t. We have
that ri,t ∈ [−ǫ, 0] for all i and t since ℓi,t ∈ [0, 1]. Let
qi,t =
∑t
t′=1 ri,t′ be the total number of outstanding shares
of security i after time t, with ~qt denoting the vector over all
i. The weight assigned to expert i at round t of the learning
algorithm corresponds to the instantaneous price of security
i in the simulated market immediately before round t, that
is, wi,t = pi(−ǫ~Lt−1) = pi(~qt−1).
By the definition of worst-case market maker loss,
maxi qi,t − (C(~qt) − C(~0)) ≤ B. It is easy to see that we
can rewrite the left-hand side of this equation to obtain
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
T∑
t=1
ri,t −
t∑
t=1
(C(~qt)− C(~qt−1)) ≤ B .
From Lemma 2, this gives us that
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
T∑
t=1
ri,t −
t∑
t=1
(
N∑
i=1
pi(~qt−1)ri,t +
ǫ2φ
2
)
≤ B.
Substituting pi(~qt−1) = wi,t and ri,t = −ǫℓi,t, we get
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
T∑
t=1
(−ǫℓi,t)−
t∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
wi,t (−ǫℓi,t) ≤ B + ǫ
2φT
2
and so
LA,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T =
t∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
wi,tℓi,t −min
i
T∑
t=1
ℓi,t
≤ B
ǫ
+
ǫφT
2
.
Setting ǫ =
√
2B/(φT ) yields the bound.
4.2 Rederiving the Weighted Majority Bound
Chen et al. [6] showed that the Weighted Majority regret
bound can be used as a starting point to rederive the worst
case loss of b logN of an LMSR market maker. Here we show
that the converse is also true; by applying Theorem 2, we
can rederive theWeighted Majority bound from the bounded
market maker loss of LMSR.
In order to apply Theorem 2, we must provide a bound
on how quickly LMSR prices can change. This is given in
the following lemma, the proof of which is in Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Let ~p be the pricing function of a LMSR with
parameter b > 0. Then
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2b .
Using Equation 5 to transform the LMSR into a learning
algorithm, we end up with weights
wi,t =
e−ǫLi,t−1/b∑N
j=1 e
−ǫLj,t−1/b
.
Setting ǫ =
√
2B/(φT ) = b
√
logN/T , we see that these
weights are equivalent to those used by Weighted Majority
with the learning rate η = ǫ/b =
√
logN/T . As mentioned
above, this is the optimal setting of η. Notice that these
weights do not depend on the value of the parameter b in
the prediction market.
We can now apply Theorem 2 to rederive the standard
Weighted Majority regret bound stated in Section 3. In
particular, setting B = b logN and φ = 2/b, we get that
when η =
√
log(N)/T ,
LWM,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T ≤ 2
√
T logN .
5. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MARKET
SCORING RULES, COST FUNCTIONS,
AND REGULARIZATION
In this section, we establish the formal connections among
market scoring rules, cost function based markets, and the
class of Follow the Regularized Leaders algorithms. We start
with a representation theorem for cost function based mar-
kets, which is crucial in our later analysis.
5.1 A Representation Theorem for Convex
Cost Functions
In this section we show a representation theorem for con-
vex cost functions. The proof of this theorem relies on the
connection between convex cost functions and a class of func-
tions known in the finance literature as convex risk measures,
which was first noted by Agrawal et al. [1]. Convex risk mea-
sures were originally introduced by Fo¨llmer and Schied [8]
to model different attitudes towards risk in financial mar-
kets. A risk measure ρ can be viewed as a mapping from
a vector of returns (corresponding to each possible outcome
of an event) to a real number. The interpretation is that a
vector of returns ~x is “preferred to” the vector ~x ′ under a
risk measure ρ if and only if ρ(~x) < ρ(~x ′).
Formally, a function ρ is a convex risk measure if it satis-
fies the following three properties:
1. Convexity: ρ(~x) is a convex function of ~x.
2. Decreasing Monotonicity: For any ~x and ~x ′, if
~x ≥ ~x ′, then ρ(~x) ≤ ρ(~x ′).
3. Negative Translation Invariance: For any ~x and
value k, ρ(~x+ k~1) = ρ(~x)− k.
The financial interpretations of these properties are not
important in our setting. More interesting for us is that
Fo¨llmer and Schied [8] provide a representation theorem that
states that a function ρ is a convex risk measure if and only
if it can be represented as
ρ(~x) = sup
~p∈∆N
(
−
N∑
i=1
pixi − α(~p)
)
where α : ∆N → (−∞,∞] is a convex, lower semi-
continuous function referred to as a penalty function. This
fact is useful because it allows us to obtain the following re-
sult, which was alluded to informally by Agrawal et al. [1].
The full proof is included here for completeness.
Lemma 4. A function C is a valid convex cost function
if and only if it is differentiable and can be represented as
C(~q) = sup
~p∈∆N
(
N∑
i=1
piqi − α(~p)
)
(6)
for a convex and lower semi-continuous function α. Further-
more, for any quantity vector ~q, the price vector ~p(~q) corre-
sponding to C is the distribution ~p maximizing
∑N
i=1 piqi −
α(~p).
Proof. Consider any differentiable function C : RN →
R. Let ρ(~q) = C(−~q). Clearly by definition, ρ satisfies de-
creasing monotonicity if and only if C satisfies increasing
monotonicity, and ρ satisfies negative translation invariance
if and only if C satisfies positive translation invariance. Fur-
thermore, ρ is convex if and only if C is convex. By The-
orem 1, this implies that C is a valid convex cost function
if and only if ρ is a convex risk measure. The first half of
the lemma then follows immediately from the representation
theorem of Fo¨llmer and Schied [8].
Now, because α(~p) is guaranteed to be convex,
∑N
i=1 piqi−
α(~p) is a concave function of ~p. The constraints
∑N
i=1 pi = 1
and pi ≥ 0 define a closed convex feasible set. Thus, the
problem of maximizing
∑N
i=1 piqi − α(~p) with respect to
~p has a global optimal solution and first-order KKT con-
ditions are both necessary and sufficient. Let ~p ∗(~q) de-
note an optimal ~p for this optimization problem. Then,
C(~q) =
∑N
i=1 p
∗
i (~q)qi − α(~p ∗(~q)). By the envelope theo-
rem [29], if C(~q) is differentiable, we have that for any i,
p∗i (~q) = ∂C(~q)/∂qi = pi(~q). Thus the market prices are pre-
cisely those which maximize the inner expression of the cost
function.
Furthermore, by a version of the envelope theorem [23], to
ensure that C is differentiable, it is sufficient to show that
α is strictly convex and differentiable.
Corollary 1. A function C is a valid convex cost func-
tion if it can be represented as in Equation 6 for a strictly
convex and differentiable function α. For any ~q, the price
vector ~p(~q) is the distribution ~p maximizing
∑N
i=1 piqi−α(~p).
The ability to represent any valid cost function in this
form allows us to define a bound on the worst-case loss of
the market maker in terms of the penalty function of the
corresponding convex risk measure.
Lemma 5. The worst-case loss of the market maker de-
fined by the cost function in Equation 6 is no more than
sup
~p,~p ′∈∆N
(
α(~p)− α(~p ′)) .
Proof. The worst-case loss of the market maker is
max
~q∈RN
(
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi − C(~q)
)
+C(~0)
= max
~q∈RN
(
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi − sup
~p∈∆N
(
N∑
i=1
piqi − α(~p)
))
+ sup
~p ′∈∆N
(−α(~p ′))
≤ max
~q∈RN
(
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi −
(
sup
~p∈∆N
N∑
i=1
piqi − sup
~p∈∆N
(α(~p))
))
+ sup
~p ′∈∆N
(−α(~p ′))
= max
~q∈RN
(
max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi − max
i∈{1,··· ,N}
qi
)
+ sup
~p∈∆N
(α(~p))
+ sup
~p ′∈∆N
(−α(~p ′))
= sup
~p,~p ′∈∆N
(
α(~p)− α(~p ′)) .
The inequality follows from the fact that for any func-
tions f and g over any domain X , supx∈X (f(x) − g(x)) ≥
supx∈X f(x)− supx′∈X g(x′).
5.2 Convex Cost Functions and Market Scor-
ing Rules
As described in Section 2, the Logarithmic Market Scoring
Rule market maker can be defined as either a market scor-
ing rule or a cost function based market. The LMSR is not
unique in this regard. As we show in this section, any reg-
ular, strictly proper market scoring rule with differentiable
scoring functions can be represented as a cost function based
market. Likewise, any convex cost function satisfying a few
mild conditions corresponds to a market scoring rule. As
long as the market probabilities are nonzero, the market
scoring rule and corresponding cost function based market
are equivalent. More precisely, a trader who changes the
market probabilities from ~r to ~r ′ in the market scoring rule
is guaranteed to receive the same payoff for every outcome i
as a trader who changes the quantity vectors from any ~q to
~q ′ such that p(~q) = ~r and p(~q ′) = ~r ′ in the cost function for-
mulation as long as every component of ~r and ~r ′ is nonzero.
Moreover, any price vector that is achievable in the market
scoring rule (that is, any ~p for which si(~p) is finite for all i)
is achievable by the cost function based market.
The fact that there exists a correspondence between cer-
tain market scoring rules and certain cost function based
markets was noted by Chen and Pennock [5]. They pointed
out that the MSR with scoring function ~s and the cost func-
tion based market with cost function C are equivalent if for
all ~q and all outcomes i, C(~q) = qi − si(~p). However, they
did not provide any guarantees about the circumstances un-
der which this condition can be satisfied. Agrawal et al. [1]
also made use of the equivalence between markets when this
strong condition holds. Our result gives very general pre-
cise conditions under which an MSR is equivalent to a cost
function based market.
Recall from Lemma 4 that any convex cost function C can
be represented as C(~q) = sup~p∈∆N
(∑N
i=1 piqi − α(~p)
)
for
a convex function α. Let αC denote the function α corre-
sponding to the cost function C. In the following, we con-
sider cost functions derived from scoring rules ~s by setting
αC(~p) =
N∑
i=1
pisi(~p) (7)
and scoring rules derived from convex cost functions with
si(~p) = αC(~p)−
N∑
j=1
∂αC(~p)
∂pj
pj +
∂αC(~p)
∂pi
. (8)
We show that there is a mapping between a mildly restricted
class of convex cost function based markets and a mildly
restricted class of strictly proper market scoring rules such
that for every pair in the mapping, Equations 7 and 8 both
hold. Furthermore, we show that the markets satisfying
these equations are equivalent in the sense described above.
Theorem 3. There is a one-to-one and onto mapping be-
tween the set of convex cost function based markets with
strictly convex and differentiable potential functions αC and
the class of strictly proper, regular market scoring rules with
differentiable scoring functions ~s such that for each pair in
the mapping, Equations 7 and 8 hold.
Furthermore, each pair of markets in this mapping are
equivalent when prices for all outcomes are positive, that
is, the profit of a trade is the same in the two markets if
the trade starts with the same market prices and results in
the same market prices and the prices for all outcomes are
positive before and after the trade. Additionally, every price
vector ~p achievable in the market scoring rule is achievable
in the cost function based market.
Proof. We first show that the function αC in Equation 7
is strictly convex and differentiable and the scoring rule in
Equation 8 is regular, strictly proper and differentiable. We
then show that Equations 7 and 8 are equivalent. Finally,
we show the equivalence between the two markets.
Consider the function αC in Equation 7. Since we have
assumed that si is differentiable for all i, αC is differentiable
too. Additionally, it is known that a scoring rule is strictly
proper only if its expected value is strictly convex [12], so
αC is strictly convex.
Consider the scoring rule defined in Equation 8. By The-
orem 1 of Gneiting and Raftery [12], a regular scoring rule
si(~p) is strictly proper if and only if there exists a strictly
convex function G(~p) such that
si(~p) = G(~p)−
N∑
j=1
pjG˙j(~p) + G˙i(~p), (9)
where Gj(~p) is any subderivative of G with respect to pj (if
G is differentiable, G˙j = ∂G(~p)/∂pj). This immediately im-
plies that the scoring rule defined in Equation 8 is a regular
strictly proper scoring rule since α(~p) is strictly convex. We
will see below that si is also differentiable.
It is easy to see that Equation 8 implies Equation 7. Sup-
pose Equation 8 holds. Then
N∑
i=1
pisi(~p) =
N∑
i=1
pi
(
αC(~p)−
N∑
j=1
∂αC(~p)
∂pj
pj +
∂αC(~p)
∂pi
)
= αC(~p) .
This also shows that si is differentiable for all i, since the
derivative of αC is well-defined at all points and
∂αC(~p)
∂pi
= si(~p) +
N∑
i=1
∂si(~p)
∂pi
.
To see that Equation 7 implies Equation 8, suppose that
Equation 7 holds. We know that the scoring rule ~s can be
expressed as in Equation 9 for some function G. For this
particular G,
αC(~p) =
N∑
i=1
pi
(
G(~p)−
N∑
j=1
pjG˙j(~p) + G˙i(~p)
)
= G(~p) .
Since G(~p) = αC(~p) and αC is differentiable (meaning that
∂αC/∂pi is the only subderivative of αC with respect to pi),
this implies Equation 8.
We have established the equivalence between Equations 7
and 8. We now show that a trader gets exactly the same
profit for any realized outcome in the two markets if the
market prices are positive.
Suppose in the cost function based market a trader
changes the outstanding shares from ~q to ~q ′. This trade
changes the market price from ~p(~q) to ~p(~q ′). If outcome i
occurs, the trader’s profit is
(q′i − qi)−
(
C(~q ′)− C(~q))
= (q′i − qi)−
(
N∑
j=1
pj(~q
′)q′j − αC(~p(~q ′))
)
+
(
N∑
j=1
pj(~q)qj − αC(~p(~q))
)
=
(
q′i −
N∑
j=1
pj(~q
′)q′j + αC(~p(~q
′))
)
−
(
qi −
N∑
j=1
pj(~q)qj + αC(~p(~q))
)
. (10)
From Lemma 4, we know that ~p(~q) is the optimal solution
to the convex optimization max~p∈∆N
(∑N
i=1 piqi − αC(~p)
)
.
The Lagrange function of this optimization problem is
L =
(
N∑
i=1
piqi − αC(~p)
)
− λ(
N∑
i=1
pi − 1) +
N∑
i=1
µipi.
Since ~p(~q) is optimal, the KKT conditions require that
∂L/∂pi = 0, which implies that for all i,
qi =
∂αC(~p(~q))
∂pi(~q)
+ λ(~q)− µi(~q), (11)
where µi(~q) ≥ 0 and µi(~q)pi(~q) = 0. Plugging (11) into (10),
we have
(q′i − qi)−
(
C(~q ′)− C(~q))
=
(
∂αC(~p(~q
′))
∂pi(~q ′)
−
N∑
j=1
pj(~q
′)
∂αC(~p(~q
′))
∂pj(~q ′)
+ αC(~p(~q
′))− µi(~q ′)
)
−
(
∂αC(~p(~q))
∂pi(~q)
−
N∑
j=1
pj(~q)
∂αC(~p(~q))
∂pj(~q)
+ αC(~p(~q))− µi(~q)
)
=
(
si(~p(~q
′))− µi(~q ′)
)− (si(~p(~q))− µi(~q)) . (12)
When pi(~q) > 0 and pi(~q
′) > 0, µi(~q) = µi(~q
′) = 0. In
this case, the profit of the trader in the cost function based
market is the same as that in the market scoring rule market
when he changes the market probability from ~p(~q) to ~p(~q ′).
Finally, observe that using the cost function based mar-
ket it is possible to achieve any price vector ~r with finite
scores si(~r) by setting qi = si(~r) for all i. By Lemma 4,
for this setting of ~q, p(~q) is the vector ~p that maximizes∑N
i= pisi(~r)−
∑N
i=1 pisi(~p). Since ~s is strictly proper, this is
maximized at ~p = ~r. Since ~s is regular, this implies that it is
possible to achieve any prices in the interior of the probabil-
ity simplex using the cost function based market (and any
prices ~p on the exterior as long as si(~p) is finite for all i).
5.3 Convex Cost Functions and FTRL
Consider a prediction market with a convex cost function
represented as C(~q) = sup~p∈∆N
(∑N
i=1 piqi − α(~p)
)
and
the corresponding learning algorithm with weights wi,t =
pi(−ǫ~Lt−1). (Recall that ~Lt−1 = 〈L1,t−1, · · · , LN,t−1〉 is the
vector of cumulative losses at time t − 1.) By Lemma 4,
the weights chosen at time t are those that maximize the
expression −ǫ∑Ni=1 wiLi,t−1 − α(~w), or equivalently, those
that minimize the expression
N∑
i=1
wiLi,t−1 +
1
ǫ
α(~w) .
This expression is of precisely the same form as Equa-
tion 3, with α playing the role of the regularizer and ǫ con-
trolling the trade-off between the regularizer and the em-
pirical loss. This implies that every convex cost function
based prediction market can be interpreted as a Follow the
Regularized Leader algorithm with a convex regularizer! By
applying Theorem 2 and Lemma 5, we can easily bound the
regret of the resulting algorithm as follows.
Theorem 4. Let C be any valid convex cost function
yielding φ-stable prices, and let αC be the penalty func-
tion associated with C. Let A be the expert learn-
ing algorithm with weights as in Equation 5 with ǫ =√
2 sup~p,~p ′∈∆N (αC(~p)− αC(~p ′))/(φT ). Then for any se-
quence of expert losses ℓi,t ∈ [0, 1] over T time steps,
LA,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T ≤
√
2Tφ sup
~p,~p ′∈∆N
(αC(~p)− αC(~p ′)) .
This bound is very similar to the bound for FTRL given in
Equation 4, with φ playing the role of λ.
The connections we established in the previous section
imply that every strictly proper market scoring rule can also
be interpreted as a FTRL algorithm, now with a strictly
convex regularizer. Conversely, any FTRL algorithm with a
differentiable and strictly convex regularizer can be viewed
as choosing weights at time t to minimize the quantity
N∑
i=1
wi (ǫLi,t−1 + si(~w))
for a strictly proper scoring rule ~s. Perhaps it is no surprise
that the weight updates of FTRL algorithms can be framed
in terms of proper scoring rules given that proper scoring
rules are commonly used as loss functions in machine learn-
ing [3, 32] and FTRL has previously been connected to Breg-
man divergences [34, 18, 17] which are known to be related
to scoring rules [12].
This connection hints at why market scoring rules and
convex cost function based markets may be able to obtain
accurate estimates of probability distributions in practice.
Both types of markets are essentially learning the distribu-
tions by treating market trades as training data. Beyond
that, both markets correspond to well-understood learning
algorithms with stable weights and guarantees of no regret.
5.4 Relation to the SCPM
Agrawal et al. [1] present another way of describing convex
cost function based prediction markets, which they call the
Sequential Convex Pari-Mutuel Mechanism (SCPM). The
SCPM is defined in terms of limit orders instead of market
prices, but the underlying mathematics are essentially the
same. In the SCPM, traders specify a maximum quantity
of shares that they would like to purchase and a maximum
price per share that they are willing to spend. The market
then decides how many shares of the trade to accept by
solving a convex optimization problem.
Agrawal et al. [1] show that for every SCPM, there is an
equivalent convex cost function based market. For each limit
order, the number of shares accepted by the market maker in
the SCPM is the minimum of the number of shares requested
by the trader and the number of shares that it would take
to drive the market price of the shares in the corresponding
cost function based market to the limit price of the trader.
Thus our results imply that any SCPM mechanism can also
be interpreted as a Follow the Regularized Leader algorithm
for learning from expert advice.
We remark that Agrawal et al. [1] also describe an in-
terpretation of the SCPM in terms of convex risk measures
and suggest that the associated penalty function is related
to the underlying problem of learning the distribution over
outcomes. However, their interpretation is very different
from ours. They view the penalty function as characterizing
“the market maker’s commitment to learning the true distri-
bution” since it impacts both the worst case market maker
loss and the willingness of the market maker to accept limit
orders. On the contrary, we view the penalty function as a
regularizer necessary to make the market prices stable.
6. EXAMPLE: THE QUADRATIC MSR
AND ONLINE GRADIENT DESCENT
In the previous section we described the relationship be-
tween market scoring rules, cost function based markets with
convex cost functions, and Follow the Regularized Leader al-
gorithms. We discussed how the Logarithmic Market Scor-
ing Rule can be represented equivalently as a cost function
based market, and how it corresponds to Weighted Majority
in the expert learning setting. In this section, we illustrate
the relationship through another example. In particular, we
show that the Quadratic Market Scoring Rule can be writ-
ten equivalently as a cost function based market (namely
the Quad-SCPM of Agrawal et al. [1]). We then show that
this market corresponds to the well-studied online gradient
descent algorithm in the learning setting and give a bound
on the regret of this algorithm using Theorem 4.
The Quadratic Market Scoring Rule (QMSR) is the mar-
ket scoring rule corresponding to the quadratic scoring func-
tion in Equation 1. As was the case in the LMSR, the pa-
rameters a1, · · · , aN do not affect the prices or payments of
this market. As such, we assume that ai = 0 for all i.
Theorem 3 implies that we can construct a cost function
based market with equivalent payoffs to the QMSR when-
ever prices are nonzero using the cost function
C(~q) = sup
~p∈∆N
(
N∑
i=1
piqi −
N∑
i=1
pib
(
2pi −
N∑
i=1
p2i
))
= sup
~p∈∆N
(
N∑
i=1
piqi − b
N∑
i=1
p2i
)
.
This is precisely the cost function associated with the Quad-
SCPM market with a uniform prior, which was previously
known to be equivalent to the QMSR when prices are
nonzero [1]. The worst case loss of the market maker in
both markets is b(N − 1)/N .
Following the argument in Section 5.3, this market corre-
sponds to the FTRL algorithm with regularizer η = 1/b and
R(~w) = ∑Ni=1 w2i . It has been observed that using FTRL
with a regularizer of this form is equivalent to online gradi-
ent descent [19, 17]. Thus we can use Theorem 4 to show a
regret bound for gradient descent.
We first show that the Quad-SCPM prices are φ-stable for
φ = (N2−1)/(2b) < N2/(2b). (See Appendix C for details.)
We can therefore apply Theorem 4 using φ = N2/(2b) and
sup~p,~p ′∈∆N (α(~p)− α(~p ′)) = b(N − 1)/N < b to see that for
gradient descent,
LGD,T − min
i∈{1,··· ,N}
Li,T ≤ N
√
T .
This matches the known regret bound for general gradient
descent applied to the experts setting [35].
7. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated the elegant mathematical connec-
tion between market scoring rules, cost function based pre-
diction markets, and no-regret learning. This connection is
thought-provoking on its own, as it yields to new interpre-
tations of well-known prediction market mechanisms. The
interpretation of the penalty function as a regularizer can
shed some light on which market scoring rule or cost func-
tion based market is best to run under different assumptions
about traders.
Additionally, this connection has the potential to be of
use in the design of new prediction market mechanisms and
learning algorithms. In recent years there has been an in-
terest in finding ways to tractably run market scoring rules
over combinatorial or infinite outcome spaces [7, 10, 6]. For
example, a market maker might wish to accept bets over
permutations (“horse A will finish the race ahead of horse
B”), Boolean spaces (“either a Democrat will win the 2010
senate race in Delaware or a Democrat will win in North
Dakota”), or real numbers (“Google’s revenue in the first
quarter of 2010 will be between $x and $y”), in which case
simply running a naive implementation of an LMSR (for
example) would be infeasible. As mentioned above, by ex-
ploiting the connection between Weighted Majority and the
LMSR, Chen et al. [6] showed that an extension of the
Weighted Majority algorithm to permutation learning [20]
could be used to approximate prices in an LMSR over per-
mutations. Given our new understanding of the connection
between markets and learning and the growing literature on
no-regret algorithms for large or infinite sets of experts [21],
it seems likely that similar learning-based techniques could
be developed to calculate market prices for other types of
large outcome spaces too.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Fix the vectors ~q and ~r. Let ~u(s) = ~q + s~r. Similarly to
how we have defined Di,j(~t), define
Di(x) =
{
∂pi(~u(s))
∂s
∣∣∣
s=x
if ∂pi(~u(s))
∂s
is defined at x,
0 otherwise.
UsingDi in place of the derivative allows us to integrate over
the derivative even when it is not defined at single points.
For any point at which the derivatives are defined, we have
∂C(~u(s))
∂s
=
N∑
i=1
∂C(~u(s))
∂ui(s)
∂ui(s)
∂s
=
N∑
i=1
pi(~u(·))ri .
Applying the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have that
C(~q + ~r)− C(~q)
=
∫ 1
0
∂C(~u(s))
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=x
dx =
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
pi(~u(x))ri dx
=
∫ 1
0
N∑
i=1
(
pi(~u(0)) +
∫ x
0
Di(y)dy
)
ri dx
=
N∑
i=1
pi(~q)ri +
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
N∑
i=1
riDi(y) dy dx .
Rearranging terms, this gives us that
C(~q + ~r)− C(~q)−
N∑
i=1
pi(~q)ri =
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
N∑
i=1
riDi(y) dy dx.
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to bound the absolute
value of the expression on the right. This is where the φ-
stability of the prices comes into play. At any point where
the derivatives are defined,
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~u(s))∂s
∣∣∣∣ =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
∂pi(~q)
∂qj
rj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qj
∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫφ .
Since we have assumed that the prices are piecewise differ-
entiable this implies that
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
N∑
i=1
riDi(y) dy dx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ǫ
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
N∑
i=1
|Di(y)| dy dx
≤ ǫ
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
ǫφ dy dx = ǫ2φ
∫ 1
0
x dx =
ǫ2φ
2
.
This bounds the absolute value of the right hand side of the
equation above and proves the lemma.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
For every i and every j 6= i, we have
∂pi(~q)
∂qi
=
∂
∂qi
eqi/b∑N
j=1 e
qj/b
=
1
b
eqi/b
∑N
j=1 e
qj/b −
(
eqi/b
)2
(∑N
j=1 e
qj/b
)2
=
1
b
(
pi(~q)− pi(~q)2
)
=
1
b
pi(~q)
∑
j 6=i
pj(~q)
and
∂pi(~q)
∂qj
=
∂
∂qj
eqi/b∑N
j=1 e
qj/b
=
1
b
−eqi/beqj/b(∑N
j=1 e
qj/b
)2
= −1
b
pi(~q)pj(~q) .
Thus we have
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qj
∣∣∣∣ =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qi
∣∣∣∣+
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qj
∣∣∣∣
=
2
b
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
pi(~q)pj(~q) .
We would like to find the prices that maximize this quan-
tity. Dropping the argument ~q to simply notation, this is
equivalent to solving a simple optimization problem:
maximize
~p∈∆N
2
b
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
pipj .
It is straight-forward to show (e.g., using the KKT condi-
tions) that this expression is maximized when the prices are
equal across all securities, so pi = 1/N for all i. Then
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∂pi(~q)∂qj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2b N(N − 1)N2 ≤ 2b .
C. STABILITY OF QUAD-SCPM PRICES
The cost function of Quad-SCPM can be written as
C(~q) = sup
~p∈∆N
(
N∑
i=1
piqi − b
N∑
i=1
p2i
)
.
By Lemma 4, the price function of Quad-SCPM is defined
by the optimal solution to the optimization problem in this
function. The Lagrange function corresponding to the con-
strained optimization problem is
L =
(
n∑
i=1
piqi − b
N∑
i=1
p2i
)
− λ
(
N∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
+
N∑
i=1
µipi.
Because the objective function is strictly concave in ~p, there
is a unique optimal solution that satisfies the KKT condi-
tions: ∂L/∂pi = 0 ∀i, ∑Ni=1 pi = 1, pi ≥ 0 ∀i, µi ≥ 0 ∀i,
and µipi = 0 ∀i. Thus, the price function is defined by

pi =
1
N
+ qi+µi
2b
−
∑N
j=1(qj+µj)
2bN
∀i
piµi = 0 ∀i
pi ≥ 0 ∀i
µi ≥ 0 ∀i.
(13)
When 1/N + qi/(2b) −∑Ni=1 qi/(2bN) > 0, µi = 0 and
pi > 0 for all i and the price function is
pi(~q) =
1
N
+
qi
2b
−
∑N
j=1 qj
2bN
,
which is the same as that of QMSR. In this case, we have
∂pi
∂qi
=
1
2b
− 1
2bN
∀i and ∂pi
∂qj
= − 1
2bN
∀j 6= i .
Consider the case in which the prices for some outcomes
equal 0. Given ~q, let M = {m : pm > 0, µm = 0} be the set
of outcomes that have positive prices. Let K = {k : pk =
0, µk > 0} be the set of the outcomes that have a positive
µk. Let L = {l : pl = 0, µl = 0} be the set of outcomes for
which both pl and µl are 0. Denote p˜ = minm∈M pm and
µ˜ = mink∈K µk. For 0 < |ǫ| < min{µ˜, 2bp˜(N − |K| − |L|)},
we consider the following cases:
• L = ∅ and i ∈M
Consider changing ~q to ~q ′, where q′i = qi + ǫ and q
′
j =
qj ∀j 6= i. We can verify that the price function for ~q ′ is
defined by

p′i = pi + (
1
2b
− 1
2b(N−|K|)
)ǫ
p′j = pj − ǫ2b(N−|K|) ∀j ∈M, j 6= i
p′k = pk = 0 ∀k ∈ K
µ′j = µj = 0 ∀j ∈M
µ′k = µk +
ǫ
N−|K|
∀k ∈ K
where ~p and ~µ are the prices and Lagrange multipliers
for ~q. Hence, by the definition of derivatives, we have
∂pi
∂qi
=
1
2b
− 1
2b(N − |K|) ∀i ∈M ,
∂pj
∂qi
= − 1
2b(N − |K|) ∀i, j ∈M, i 6= j ,
∂pk
∂qi
= 0 ∀k ∈ K, i ∈M .
• L 6= ∅ and i ∈M
Consider changing ~q to ~q ′, where q′i = qi + ǫ and q
′
j =
qj ∀j 6= i. The new prices are defined by

p′i = pi + (
1
2b
− 1
2b(N−|K|−|L|)
)ǫ
p′j = pj − ǫ2b(N−|K|−|L|) ∀j ∈M, j 6= i
p′k = pk = 0 ∀k ∈ K
p′l = pl = 0 ∀l ∈ L
µ′j = µj = 0 ∀j ∈M
µ′k = µk +
ǫ
N−|K|−|L|
∀k ∈ K
µ′l = µl +
ǫ
N−|K|−|L|
∀l ∈ L
if ǫ > 0, and

p′i = pi + (
1
2b
− 1
2b(N−|K|)
)ǫ
p′j = pj − ǫ2b(N−|K|) ∀j ∈M, j 6= i
p′k = pk = 0 ∀k ∈ K
p′l = pl − ǫ2b(N−|K|) ∀l ∈ L
µ′j = µj = 0 ∀j ∈M
µ′k = µk +
ǫ
N−|K|
∀k ∈ K
µ′l = µl = 0 ∀l ∈ L
if ǫ < 0.
From the above, we can see that the prices of all out-
comes are continuous while we changing qi in its ǫ-
neighborhood. However, ∂pi/∂qi, ∂pj/∂qi, and ∂pl/∂qi
are not defined at ~q for all i, j ∈ M , i 6= j, and l ∈ L,
because the left and right derivatives do not equal. We
only have ∂pk/∂qi = 0 for all k ∈ K and i ∈M .
• L 6= ∅, l ∈ L
When changing ~q to ~q ′, where q′l = ql + ǫ and q
′
j =
qj ∀j 6= l, similar to the above case, the new optimal
solution is different for ǫ > 0 and ǫ < 0. In particular,
when ǫ > 0,
p′l = pl + (
1
2b
− 1
2b(N − |K|) )ǫ,
p′j = pj − ǫ2b(N − |K|) ∀j ∈M ∪ L such that j 6= l,
and p′k = pk = 0 ∀k ∈ K. When ǫ < 0, p′j = pj ∀j,
µ′l = µl − ǫ, and µ′j = µj ∀j 6= k.
We can see that the prices of all outcomes are continuous
while we changing ql in its ǫ-neighborhood. But ∂pl/∂ql
and ∂pj/∂ql are not defined at ~q for all j ∈M ∪L, j 6= l,
and l ∈ L, because the left and right derivatives do not
equal. ∂pk/∂ql = 0 for all k ∈ K and l ∈ L.
• k ∈ K
Consider changing ~q to ~q ′, where q′k = qk + ǫ and q
′
j =
qj ∀j 6= k, the new prices are defined by p′j = pj ∀j,
µ′k = µk − ǫ, and µ′j = µj ∀j 6= k. Thus, we have
∂pk/∂qk = 0 ∀k ∈ K, ∂pj/∂qk = 0 ∀k, j ∈ K, and
∂pj/∂qk = 0 ∀j ∈M, k ∈ K.
The above shows that the price functions are continuous
everywhere, but not differentiable everywhere. In particular,
when L is not empty (i.e., given ~q there exists some outcome
i such that both pi(~q) and µi(~q) are zero), some of the partial
derivatives are not defined at ~q. This corresponds to the
second and third cases shown above. We further note that
in these two cases, for any i ∈ M and l ∈ L, any change
in qi or ql will cause the set of L to become empty, because
either pl or µl will become positive for all l ∈ L. This means
that the prices are differentiable almost everywhere, with
the only exceptions at finite number of points when L 6= ∅.
Because 0 ≤ |K| ≤ N − 1, 0 ≤ Di,i(t) ≤ 1/(2b)− 1/(2bN)
and −1/(2b) ≤ Di,j(t) ≤ 0. We have
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
|Di,j(t)| ≤ N
(
1
2b
− 1
2bN
)
+N(N−1) 1
2b
=
N2 − 1
2b
.
